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AFTER FORTY YEARS OF ANTITRUST REVISION 
AND APPLE INC. V. PEPPER, WHAT NOW 
ILLINOIS BRICK? 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON* 
ABSTRACT 
Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in an-
titrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the type 
of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and what 
types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in January 
of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, ruled 
that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered an antitrust 
injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were violated, the 
party raising the issue had to have suffered the type of harm the 
laws were designed to avoid. Then in a fourteen day span the Court 
decided Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania and Illinois Brick 
Co. v. Illinois. In Sylvania, the Court held that vertical restraints 
on distribution were to be assessed under the rule of reason as op-
posed to the per se standard. In so doing the Court adopted rea-
soning that would carry over to vertical restraints on prices and 
applied in the context of some horizontal restraint cases. In Illinois 
Brick, in a six to three decision, it held that indirect purchases could 
not recover from price fixing firms even if the higher prices were 
passed onto those purchasers by those purchasing directly from the 
price fixers. Of these opinions, Illinois Brick has little, if any, con-
tinuing justification. This has been true for some time but now that 
matter is more critical in the aftermath of the Supreme Court de-
cision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, which exposed after forty years, the 
indeterminacy of Illinois Brick. 
*Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar, University of Florida College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in 
antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the 
type of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and 
what types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in 
January of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat,1 ruled that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered 
an antitrust injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were 
violated, the party raising the issue had to have suffered the type 
of harm the laws were designed to avoid.2 Then in a fourteen day 
span, the Court decided Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania3 
and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.4 In Sylvania, the Court held that 
vertical restraints on distribution were to be assessed under the 
rule of reason as opposed to the per se standard.5 In so doing, the 
Court adopted reasoning that would carry over to vertical restraints 
on prices6 and applied in the context of some horizontal restraint 
cases.7 In Illinois Brick, in a six to three decision, it held that in-
direct purchasers could not recover from price fixing firms even if 
the higher prices were passed onto those purchasers by those pur-
chasing directly from the price fixers.8 
 Of these opinions, Illinois Brick has little, if any, continuing 
justification. More precisely, it has become irrelevant in the pro-
cess decreasing error rates in antitrust.9 This has been true for some 
time, but now that matter is more critical in the aftermath of the 
1 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
2 Id. 
3 Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 36 (1977). 
4 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 720 (1977). 
5 See Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 57–59. 
6 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878, 
882 (2007). 
7 See, e.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189–90 (7th Cir. 
1985); Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1378–79 (W.D. Wis. 1997). 
8 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 720. 
9 Errors can come in two forms. False positives mean condemning an activity 
that is pro-competitive or harmless. False negatives mean no response to activities 
that are actually harmful. Barry Barnett, Fear of False Positives Distorts Antitrust, 
THE CONTINGENCY (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.thecontingency.com/2015/08 
/fear-of-false-positives-distorts-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/5Y6P-M9AR]. 
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Supreme Court decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper10 which exposed, 
after forty years, the indeterminacy of Illinois Brick. The two pol-
icies of Illinois Brick were to balance over and under deterrence of 
the antitrust laws11 and to avoid “massive evidence and complicated 
theories” in antitrust litigation.12 Antitrust law has changed dra-
matically in the forty years since Illinois Brick making these policies 
achievable without the costs Illinois Brick imposes on down-
stream purchasers.13 Thus, like many things—cars, old computers, 
dated editions of casebooks—Illinois Brick should be retired by 
being overturned or modified. 
 The reasons are best understood after a closer examination 
of Illinois Brick and where it fits in 2020 antitrust jurisprudence 
but a brief listing of the reasons here is useful. First, as Apple Inc. 
indicates, new marketing techniques have blurred the distinction 
between direct and indirect purchasers.14 Indeed, today’s marketing 
arrangements were likely unforeseeable by the Court in 1977. 
10 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522 (2019). Illinois Brick has received substantial attention 
in the antitrust literature. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on 
Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 443 (2001); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexam-
ining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999); Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and 
a Look Ahead, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1 (2004); Andrew L. Gavil, Thinking 
Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 167–
68 (2009); Andrew S. Gehring, The Power of the Purchaser: The Effect of Indi-
rect Purchaser Damages Suits on Deterring Antitrust Violations, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 208, 208 (2010); Barak Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding 
Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 69, 69 (2007); Maarten P. Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 
Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion, 30 
RAND J. ECON. 683, 683 (2008). 
11 As will be discussed below, the Court also sought to balance the risk of 
multiple liability against encouraging parties to act as private attorney generals. 
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746. 
12 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526. This rationale has always had a tail-wagging-
the-dog character. Antitrust cases are complicated by nature but the Court’s 
view seems to be that it is better to risk a false negative than to deal with a 
complicated process that only relates to the remedy. See id. 
13 See id. at 1525. 
14 In Apple Inc., Apple sold iPhone applications that were designed by oth-
ers. Apple allowed the developers to set the price of the applications and withheld 
30 percent of the price charged for itself. Thus, while it was a direct seller, it did 
not control the price except for requiring all prices to end in $0.99. Id. at 1519. 
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More surprising, Apple Inc. reveals that after forty years of appli-
cation the Court is split on what Illinois Brick stands for.15 To the 
five Justice majority, Illinois Brick provides a bright-line test.16 To 
the four Justice minority it is but an application of a proximate cause 
analysis.17 Second, unlike 1977, now very few practices are per se 
illegal and rule of reason cases very rarely make it to a stage at 
which apportioning damages would be necessary.18 This also means 
that to the extent Illinois Brick was based on the fear of multiple 
liability and over-deterrence,19 that risk is now remote. Third, rel-
atively new and higher standards for the introduction of expert 
testimony,20 surviving summary judgment,21 and class certification22 
also mean that many of the dangers outlined in Illinois Brick are 
only theoretical. Fourth, antitrust standing and antitrust injury 
analysis developed after Illinois Brick address all the policy con-
cerns of that case, but can be viewed as allowing a more nuanced 
approach to the question of which parties are eligible to bring an 
antitrust action.23 Finally, there are strong arguments that Illinois 
Brick was decided incorrectly at the time because it was premised 
on a mistaken view of damages in price fixing cases.24 
 Before considering these factors and others, Part I takes a 
close look at Illinois Brick and the cases in its aftermath that es-
tablish the indirect purchaser rule. An argument is made that Illinois 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 146–88. 
16 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1524. 
17 See infra text at accompanying notes 183–90. 
18 For an empirical study, see Michael Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Em-
pirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009) [hereinafter 
Carrier, The Rule of Reason]; Michael Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging 
the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter Carrier, Bridging 
the Disconnect]. 
19 Over-deterrence creates the risk of false positive—results that condemn 
practices that are harmless or pro-competitive. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Compe-
tition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
at 13–14 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single 
-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act [https://perma.cc/CHK6-NZ89]. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 269–77. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 249–66. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 280–83. 
23 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522 (2019). 
24 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LOST PROFITS 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN PRICE ENHANCEMENT CASES 725 (West, 4th ed. 2011); 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement 
Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 751, 759–60 (1980). 
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Brick was limited or even overturned in the Court’s principal 
standing opinion, Associated General Contractors of California v. 
California State Council of Carpenters25 and it was not until the 
1990 decision in Kansas v. UtiliCorp Inc. that the indirect purchaser 
rule became iron clad.26 
 The implication of this analysis is that until 1990, the pa-
rameters of Illinois Brick were vague. Now, after Apple Inc., the 
status of Illinois Brick’s status is uncertain. In fact, both the ma-
jority and dissent in Apple Inc. make arguments that seem to un-
dermine the holding in Illinois Brick.27 Part II is the heart of the 
analysis. Each of the factors that support the notion that Illinois 
Brick is no more than an antitrust nuisance are discussed. The 
point made is that the antitrust world has shifted in the forty years 
since Illinois Brick. Apple Inc. is the latest shift to make Illinois 
Brick obsolete. In Conclusions and Recommendations, three pro-
posals are offered. One is that Illinois Brick be revisited and over-
turned and replaced with a reasonably foreseeable standard. Another 
is that indirect purchasers be permitted to collect from price fixing 
firms when it is determined that direct purchasers seem unlikely 
to take action. A final one is that whether plaintiffs are direct or indi-
rect purchasers simply be one factor to be weighed in the analysis. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIRECT PURCHASER 
ELEMENT OF ANTITRUST STANDING 
A. Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick 
 Illinois Brick is actually the second of two cases that raised 
complementary issues. The first, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., was decided nine years earlier.28 There a defend-
ant was found to have violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by, 
among other things, only renting as opposed to selling shoe-making 
machinery to shoe manufacturers.29 The damages were calculated 
as the difference between the amounts paid to rent the machinery 
25 459 U.S. 519, 544–46 (1983). For a discussion of this possibility, see supra 
text accompanying notes 10–24. 
26 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 14, 16. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 174–89. 
28 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 481 (1968). 
29 Id. at 483. 
2020] WHAT NOW ILLINOIS BRICK 701 
and the cost to buy the machinery had it been made available for 
sale.30 The Court referred to this as an overcharge.31 Defendant, 
United Shoe, argued that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs—
shoe manufacturers—should be reduced to the extent those plaintiffs 
were able to pass on the damages to its own customers.32 The Court 
rejected the “pass[-]on defense,” noting that it would be difficult 
and perhaps only theoretically possible,33 to isolate the extent to 
which the overcharge had been passed-on. In addition, the Court 
was fearful that treble damage actions would lose much of their 
effectiveness because dividing up the overcharge among the layers 
in the chain of distribution would lower the incentives for direct pur-
chasers to bring an action.34 In many respects, Hanover Shoe can 
be seen as promoting the private the enforcement of antitrust law. 
 After a great deal of scholarly commentary35 Illinois Brick, 
the corollary to Hanover Shoe, was decided in 1977. The Court 
was composed of only four members who had served on the Hanover 
Shoe Court and, as evidenced by Sylvania, the Court’s approach to 
antitrust had undergone a change.36 Here the issue was whether 
30 Id. at 483–84. 
31 Id. at 490. 
32 Id. at 481. 
33 Id. at 493. 
34 Id. at 494. 
35 See, e.g., John Cirace, Price Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-On Problem in 
Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
171, 171 (1977); Robert C. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monop-
oly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 270–
71 (1979); Robert Landes & Richard Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have 
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule 
of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 602 (1979); Robert Landes & Richard 
Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1274, 1274 (1980); Bartlett McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and 
the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages under Hanover Shoe, 
33 U. PITT. L. REV. 177, 177 (1971); Earl E. Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages 
and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 
1183, 1183 (1968); Elmer Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble 
Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
883, 884 (1975); Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive 
Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976, 979 (1975); see also Note, The De-
fense of “Passing On” in Treble Damages Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 
YALE L.J. 469, 472 (1961). 
36 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING 
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 223–27 (7th ed. 2019); supra text 
accompanying note 3. 
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overcharges passed-on to indirect purchasers could be recovered 
by those indirect purchasers.37 This is the offensive use of the 
pass-on rationale.38 The Court had three choices.39 It could have 
overturned Hanover Shoe and declared that both offensive and 
defensive use of the pass-on theory was permitted.40 It could have 
left Hanover Shoe undisturbed and held that offensive use of the 
pass-on theory was permissible while defensive use was not.41 Fi-
nally, it could have left Hanover Shoe intact and ruled that offensive 
use of the theory was not permitted.42 In a six–three decision it chose 
this last possibility.43 
 The Court’s analysis involved two steps.44 The first step was 
deciding that plaintiffs and defendants were to be treated alike as 
far as relying on the pass-on theory.45 It rejected the arguments of 
the dissenters that parallel treatment was unnecessary.46 Allowing 
offensive but not defensive use of the theory would, the Court rea-
soned, result in a “serious risk of multiple liability.”47 In addition, 
allowing offensive but not defensive use would give rise to the same 
tracing complexities addressed in Hanover Shoe,48 which stood for 
the idea that the antitrust law would be more effectively enforced 
by concentrating the incentive to bring an action in the hands of 
direct purchasers.49 
 Having decided that plaintiffs and defendants should re-
ceive similar treatment, the Court rejected the use of pass-on 
analysis for both parties.50 In dismissing this option, the Court 
relied to some extent on the lack of legislative action in response to 
its Hanover Shoe decision. 51 Mainly, though, the Court was con-
cerned with the complex and massive process of tracing damages 
37 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 724 (1977). 
38 Id. at 720. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 735. 
42 See id. at 720–21. 
43 See id. 
44 See id.  
45 See id. at 720. 
46 Id. at 728. 
47 Id. at 730. 
48 Id. at 741–43. 
49 Id. at 725–26. 
50 Id. at 735. 
51 Id. at 736. 
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from manufacturer to distributor and so on.52 Ultimately, the Court 
saw itself as choosing between antitrust damages designed to com-
pensate plaintiffs or providing a deterrence to anticompetitive 
practices.53 It reasoned that the compensation goal would dilute 
the incentives for purchasers at any level to take on the task of act-
ing as a private attorney general.54 
 The Court did leave open the possibility of two exceptions 
in which indirect purchasers might recover. The first involves pre-
existing cost-plus contracts.55 If an indirect purchaser has a cost-
plus contract with its supplier, then any price increase by that 
supplier will be passed onto the indirect purchaser.56 The second 
exception occurs when the direct seller is owned or controlled by 
the indirect seller.57 
 Together, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick advance the poli-
cies of avoiding complications on the assessments of damages while 
concentrating incentives for private enforcement of the antitrust 
laws in direct purchasers. A number of factors are noteworthy. 
First, the opinion in Illinois Brick is rather cleverly constructed. 
The Court viewed itself as having to choose between compensation 
goals and deterrence goals. Yet this was a quandary of the Court’s 
making. It could have achieved both goals by leaving Hanover Shoe 
intact and allowing offensive use of pass-on theory. It was only 
left to choose because, in the initial part of the opinion, it rejected 
the dissenters’ arguments that this should be the outcome. Sec-
ond, Illinois Brick, at some level, can be read to be very pro en-
forcement. As noted, the Court writes in terms of providing the 
greatest incentive to direct purchasers.58 In actuality, the opinion 
has become a tool for avoiding liability.59 Third, the Court con-
ceded that some direct purchasers would be reluctant to bring ac-
tions against suppliers for fear of damaging their relationships.60 
Still, without offering any compelling reasoning, the Court claimed 
52 Id. at 744. 
53 Id. at 745–46. 
54 Id. at 746. 
55 Id. at 736. 
56 Id. at 736 n.16. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 735. 
59 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 1. 
60 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746. 
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that the “private attorney general” theme of the antitrust laws was 
better served by allowing only direct purchasers to sue.61 
 Fourth, the rationale for the two cases together is some-
what garbled. In Illinois Brick, in particular, the Court cautioned 
against the risk of multiple liability, which suggests a possibility 
of over-deterrence and false positives.62 On the other hand, it also 
suggests that allowing offensive use of the pass through theory 
would dilute private enforcement efforts and, by implication, cre-
ate a risk of false negatives.63 By implication the Court seems to 
believe there is some correct level of deterrence, but it did not ar-
ticulate a standard for the balancing process in which it engaged. 
 In actuality, whatever notion that there is some optimal 
level of antitrust enforcement behind the Court’s analysis was 
completely undermined a few years later in California v. ARC 
America Corp.,64 in which the Court upheld the rights of states to 
enact legislation allowing for indirect purchaser action. In effect, 
the risk of multiple liability became a function of geography as 
opposed to any knowable antitrust policy.65 In short, whatever role 
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick were thought to play in balancing 
false positives and false negatives has been rendered moot. 
 Finally, both decisions are premised on the idea that damages 
in some cases are measured by the extent to which prices are above 
the prices that would exist in the absence of a violation.66 Further-
more, the pass-on theory means dividing up this gross overcharge 
among those in the chain of distribution.67 This is unnecessary if 
damages are measured by the actual losses to firms which would be 
manifested as lost profits. In fact, lost profits seem more in line 
61 Id. 
62 False positives are instances of labeling as anticompetitive practices that 
are actually pro-competitive or, at least, harmless. Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 
963 (2010). 
63 “False negative” refers to instances in which practices that are anticom-
petitive are not labeled as such. Lee Goldman, Trouble for the Private Enforcement 
of the Sherman Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and the Oligopoly Problem, 
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (2008). 
64 490 U.S. 93 (1989); see Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 11–13. 
65 It also should have ended discussions about optimal level of antitrust en-
forcement and sanctions since both federal and state antitrust regimes can exist 
and have different substantive as well as remedial rules. Cirace, supra note 35, 
at 174. 
66 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 725 n.3. 
67 Id. at 726. 
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with the statutory requirement that the injury be “in ... business or 
property.”68 In fact, it is possible for an overcharged firm to suffer 
only minor injury. Oddly, the Hanover Shoe Court actually notes the 
availability of lost profits as a measure of damages in some cases69 
but opts for overcharge in reliance on a case in which the overcharge 
was to a municipality, which obviously could not have suffered a 
decrease in profit.70 
 Still, Illinois Brick persists. Whether it and Hanover Shoe 
have played any meaningful role in balancing over and under de-
terrence is doubtful.71 Similarly, the effort to simplify damages 
calculations has a tail-wagging-the-dog character in that anti-
trust cases tend to be complicated and damages calculations are 
often difficult. Nevertheless, courts have not otherwise elimi-
nated entire classes of plaintiffs based on these difficulties.72 If all 
other variables had remained the same as they were in 1977 per-
haps Illinois Brick, in particular, was a sensible reaction.73 The 
problem, as the following points out, is that very little in antitrust 
remains as it was in 1977.74 In fact, subsequent events, as dis-
cussed below, have made Illinois Brick not much more than an 
antitrust nuisance. Perhaps most importantly, and as Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper demonstrates, although Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick 
described the consequences of being a direct or an indirect pur-
chaser, neither case established a bright-line test for determining 
when one is a direct or an indirect purchaser.75 
B. Associated General Contractors 
 Although Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick seemed straight 
forward, the Court’s 1983 decision in Associated General Contractors 
68 15 U.S.C § 15(a) (2019). 
69 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 503 (1968). 
70 Id. at 489–90. 
71 It is worth noting that any coherent policy with respect to optimal levels 
of antitrust enforcement advanced by Illinois Brick was ended with the pas-
sage of indirect purchaser statutes by states, which allow offensive use of the 
pass-on theory. Thus, the level of exposure of a defendant may depend more on 
geography than actual harm caused. The statutes were upheld by the Supreme 
Court in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989). 
72 Blair & Harrison, supra note 10, at 2. 
73 Id. at 25. 
74 Id. 
75 See infra text accompanying notes 146–85. 
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of California v. California State Council of Carpenters76 introduced 
an element of vagueness. That case presented the Court with an 
opportunity to clarify which parties were eligible to bring private 
antitrust actions by weaving together the interests of deterrence, 
avoidance of multiple liability, and avoidance of undue complica-
tion.77 It declined this opportunity and issued an opinion that 
stands better than most cases for the adage that bad facts make 
for bad law. 
 The complaint, simply put, was that various building con-
tractors, who were members of a multi-employer bargaining associa-
tion, had put pressure on other members and nonmembers to enter 
into contracts with nonunion firms.78 Plaintiffs were unions that 
claimed to be injured by virtue of what amounted to a group boycott.79 
 In what has become the Court’s most important antitrust 
standing opinion, it held that the unions did not qualify under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act as “any person” that has been injured 
in their “business or property.”80 It was not that the union was not 
a person; it was just not the right person.81 The Court interpreted 
section 4, despite the “any person” language, as permitting only 
certain parties to have standing.82 The Court started by noting 
that the process of determining which parties were eligible to bring 
antitrust actions was comparable to common law courts defining 
proximate cause.83 It seems to suggest in this regard that the pro-
cess involves weighing various factors. Thus, “the infinite variety 
of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce 
a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.”84 
 The Court then goes on to identify the factors to be consid-
ered.85 First, the party must have suffered the type of injury the 
antitrust laws were designed to avoid.86 This was, of course, con-
sistent with the Court’s decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
76 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 544–46 (1983). 
77 Id. at 519–20. 
78 Id. at 522–23. 
79 Id. at 521–24. 
80 Id. at 546. 
81 Id. at 542. 
82 Id. at 529, 535. 
83 Id. at 535 
84 Id. at 536. 
85 Id. at 537. 
86 Id. at 538. 
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Bowl-O-Mat.87 Antitrust injury is a necessary condition in order 
to have antitrust standing.88 The Court goes on to state “[a]n ad-
ditional factor is the directness or indirectness of the asserted in-
jury.”89 This, of course, folds Illinois Brick factors into standing 
analysis.90 It is not clear, though, that the Court intended to say, 
as it seemed to with respect to antitrust injury, that only direct 
purchasers have standing. Instead, the Court restates the policies 
underlying Illinois Brick: “[t]he existence of an identifiable class 
of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to 
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes 
the justification for allowing a more remote party ... to perform the 
office of a private attorney general.”91 The language of the Court does 
not sound as though one must be a direct purchaser to have standing, 
although there is definitely a reference for that.92 Finally, echoing 
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court indicated that stand-
ing decisions should advance the policies of avoiding duplicative 
recoveries and overly complicated antitrust trials especially with 
respect to the issue of damages.93 Here again, though, the Court 
seemed to hedge noting that there was a “strong interest ... in keeping 
the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable 
limits.”94 For reasons that are not clear, the Court envisioned a com-
mon fund that would have to be allocated among plaintiffs as opposed 
to permitting each plaintiff to demonstrate its actual damages.95 
 The question arguably left open by Associated General Con-
tractors was whether the Court had retreated somewhat from 
what could be called a per se requirement that all plaintiffs must 
have suffered both antitrust injury and to have suffered it directly.96 
Further support from this position can be found in the Court’s 
concluding comments: 
Other relevant factors—the nature of the Union’s injury, the 
tenuous and speculative character of the relationship between 
87 428 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1977). 
88 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538. 
89 Id. at 540. 
90 Id. at 534–35. 
91 Id. at 542 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 542. 
93 Id. at 543–44. 
94 Id. at 543. 
95 Id. at 544. 
96 See generally id. 
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the alleged antitrust violation and the Union’s alleged injury, 
the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportion-
ment of damages, and the existence of more direct victims of 
the alleged conspiracy—weigh heavily against judicial enforce-
ment of the Union’s antitrust claim.97 
 It is possible, even likely, that Associated General Contrac-
tors stands for the proposition that the directness of the antitrust 
injury is but one factor to we weighed in determining antitrust 
standing. If so, Associated General Contractors could legitimately 
be viewed as implicitly limiting Illinois Brick. Certainly, this is 
not the conventional interpretation and antitrust injury and direct 
injury have both become necessary for antitrust standing.98 It is not 
necessary, however, to read Associated General Contractors as firmly 
establishing this outcome. In fact, read closely, it appears that some 
indirect purchasers would qualify. For example, surely an indi-
rect purchaser who pays a higher price because it buys from a 
seller who has paid a higher price due to price fixing has suffered 
the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. In 
addition, the indirect purchaser may be the most likely to bring 
an action especially if the direct purchaser desires to remain in 
good standing with its price fixing supplier.99 The risk of multiple 
liability and complications in determining damages only comes 
into play if the plaintiff is permitted to recover some amount more 
than actual harm or if a court clings to the mistaken notion that 
all antitrust damages are manifested as an overcharge.100 
C. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc. 
 Whatever door was left open by Associated General Contrac-
tors to allow courts to treat directness of harm as a factor in de-
termining standing was closed in 1990 by the Court’s 5–4 decision 
in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.101 The very strong position 
adopted by the smallest possible majority of the Court concerned 
the standing of ratepayers to whom the cost of natural gas was 
passed on to by a regulated utility.102 The Court correctly viewed 
97 Id. at 545–46 (emphasis added). 
98 See generally id.  
99 See infra text accompanying notes 295–307. 
100 Id.  
101 See generally Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
102 See id. at 204. 
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the ratepayers as indirect purchasers and, thus, the issue was 
framed as whether there should be an exception to Illinois 
Brick.103 The framing of the question is critical. The Court could 
have said that after Associated General Contractors, directness of 
injury was but a factor in determining standing. Instead it re-
turned (if it had ever deviated) to the view that directness is a 
necessary condition of standing.104 The ratepayers argued that the 
complexities avoided by Illinois Brick did not apply when the full 
overcharge was automatically passed on to them.105 
 According to the Court there were three problems with this 
position.106 First, the implication of the ratepayers’ argument was 
that the utility itself was not injured.107 The Court reasoned that 
this was impossible to know.108 For example, the market may have 
been ripe for a price increase that would have benefitted the utility.109 
This opportunity may have been removed when the utility was forced 
to raise prices due to the cost increase.110 Second, there could be 
delays in the passing on process that caused damage to the utility.111 
Third, the Court indicated that the nature of rate regulation made 
it unnecessary it compensate ratepayers112 because any recovery 
by the direct purchaser would likely be passed on to ratepayers, 
thereby off setting any overcharge. The Court also responded to the 
argument that a utility, if permitted to pass on the overcharge, 
would not have the incentive to sue its suppliers.113 It noted that 
historically utilities had brought actions under the antitrust laws.114 
In addition, it was possible utilities that did not sue suppliers would 
not be permitted to shift avoidable overcharges to consumers.115 
 Ultimately the Court left little room to expand on the possibil-
ity of a more nuanced standing analysis as hinted at in Associated 
103 Id. at 200. 
104 Id. at 208. 
105 Id. 
106 See generally id. at 208–12.  
107 See id. at 209.  
108 See id. at 210. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 212. 
113 Id. at 214. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 215–16. 
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General Contractors. Although it conceded that “the rationales 
underlying Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick will not apply with 
equal force in all cases,”116 it went on to say “[t]he possibility of 
allowing an exception, even in a rather meritorious case, would 
undermine the rule.”117 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH ILLINOIS BRICK IN THE POST-SYLVANIA ERA 
A. The Not-So-Simple Application of Illinois Brick and the  
Implications of Apple Inc. v. Pepper 
Although it seems like Illinois Brick along with UtiliCorp 
establish a bright-line test, that is not the case. We know what the 
consequences are when a potential plaintiff is viewed as indirect. 
What those cases do not tell us, as Apple Inc. v. Pepper demonstrates, 
is that classifying a party as direct or indirect is not necessarily an 
easy matter. The indeterminacy has become more important lately 
as distribution chains, with the advent of the internet, take forms 
the Court could hardly have imagined 40 years ago. Still the problem 
is not a new one. 
1. Pre–Apple Inc. Cases 
 An early case illustrating this problem is Mid-West Paper 
Products Co. v. Continental Group. Inc., in which plaintiffs pur-
chased from competitors of the defendant which engaged in price 
fixing. 118 The allegation was that plaintiffs paid higher prices be-
cause their supplier was able to raise prices in light of the higher 
prices fixed by other sellers.119 Plaintiffs were direct purchasers 
but not from those engaged in price fixing.120 Nevertheless, their 
harm, in terms of paying supercompetitive prices was arguably a 
direct result of the price fixing.121 The Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit applied Illinois Brick in holding that plaintiffs did 
not have standing.122 The court primarily replied on the difficulty 
116 Id. at 216. 
117 Id. 
118 Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., 596 F.2d 573, 575 (3d Cir. 1979). 
119 See id. at 575. 
120 See id. at 575–76. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 584. 
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of determining damages when it was unclear how much of the 
price charged was a result of price fixing and how much was trace-
able to other variables.123 In particular the court noted that even 
though the plaintiff did not purchase through an intermediary, the 
actual damages were “indirect” and, therefore, analogous to those 
suffered by indirect purchasers.124 
 A similar issue arose in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore An-
titrust Litigation in which railroads serving the steel industry were 
alleged to have blocked the entry of lower cost means of transporting 
iron ore. 125 The issue was whether steel companies had standing un-
der the theory that they had to pay more to non-conspiring compa-
nies.126 This time, the same court that had decided Mid-West Paper 
determined that plaintiffs did have standing because the impact 
was “directly traceable”127 to the actions of the defendants. According 
to the court, current law does not support the conclusion that “in-
direct purchaser status is the death knell of plaintiff’s claim.”128 It 
reasoned that the possibility of duplicate recovery, as cautioned 
against by Illinois Brick, could be addressed at the proof of dam-
ages stage of the proceedings.129 The court seemed to redefine “direct 
purchaser” to mean “a purchaser directly affected.”130 
 The difficulty of applying Illinois Brick is further illustrated 
by Delaware Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, a 
more recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.131 The 
plaintiff, a hospital, in the action purchased supplies indirectly from 
Johnson & Johnson.132 The price it paid, however, was determined 
by negotiation between a group-buying organization of which it 
was a member and Johnson & Johnson.133 The actual purchase was 
made through a distributor but at the price agreed upon by the 
123 Id. at 585. 
124 See id. at 585–86. 
125 See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.3d 1144, 1151 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1167. 
128 Id. at 1168. 
129 Id. at 1169. 
130 See id. at 1168. 
131 Delaware Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 
1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008). 
132 Id. at 1118. 
133 See id. at 1118–19. 
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group-buying organization and the plaintiff.134 This effectively re-
duced the middleman to a conduit. Nevertheless, the court, placing 
form over substance, held that a correct application of Illinois Brick 
meant the plaintiff lacked standing.135 
 Maybe the most confusing and well-known case demonstrat-
ing the difficulty of applying Illinois Brick is the 1998 opinion of 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Campos v. Ticketmaster.136 
Plaintiffs were purchasers of a concert ticket from Ticketmaster.137 
Ticketmaster had contracts with most concert venues that allowed 
Ticketmaster to distribute tickets for events held at those venues.138 
Plaintiffs claimed that Ticketmaster had unlawfully raised the 
prices of distributing tickets and that they—concertgoers—were 
direct purchasers of those services.139 Here the Eight Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the concertgoers were indirect purchasers and, 
thus, lacked standing under Illinois Brick.140 The court viewed 
the venues as the direct purchasers of distribution services and the 
concertgoers as indirect purchasers.141 In effect, distribution ser-
vices were first purchased by venues and then the cost passed on to 
concertgoers.142 According to the court, concertgoers were like 
homeowners who hired a painter to paint their houses.143 The 
painter then purchased the paint and the homeowners were then 
indirect purchasers of the paint.144 The form over substance char-
acter of this rigid application of Illinois Brick can be understood 
by noting that the scenario changes if the painter simply tells the 
homeowner how much paint is needed and the homeowner pur-
chases it. In between is the possibility that the painter itemizes 
expenses as either cost of paint or cost of labor. In all scenarios, 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 1123–24. More recently, the Ninth Circuit sought to distinguish 
Delaware Surgical Supply in In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 
323–24 (9th Cir. 2017). That decision lead to Apple Inc. v. Pepper. 
136 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998). 
137 Id. at 1166. 
138 Id. at 1168. 
139 Id. at 1171. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1174. 
143 Id. at 1170. 
144 Id.  
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the substance is the same yet, since 1977, antitrust enforcement has 
depended on these non-substantive distinctions.145 
2. Apple Inc. v. Pepper 
 The inability of Illinois Brick to deal with increasingly com-
monplace scenarios is best exemplified by Apple v. Pepper and, in 
particular, the way it divided the Supreme Court. Notably, after 
forty years of courts applying Illinois Brick the Supreme Court 
split on its basic holding.146 Plaintiffs were purchasers of smartphone 
apps who claimed that Apple had monopolized the iPhone app 
market.147 Apple defended by claiming the plaintiffs were indirect 
purchasers.148 Factually, Apple sells apps from its App Store. Some 
apps are developed by Apple and other are developed by third par-
ties.149 When one of the third-party apps is sold, Apple receives a 
30 percent commission and the remainder goes to the developer.150 
Developers are not permitted to sell apps through any other methods 
of distribution.151 Perhaps most important is the fact that Apple 
does not set the price of the apps.152 Those are set by the app sup-
pliers with the only restriction being that the price end in $0.99.153 
Before the Supreme Court, Apple’s argument was that it sold dis-
tribution services to app producers and was, if anything, an indi-
rect seller to consumers, was accepted by the trial court,154 which 
found that plaintiffs lacked standing under Illinois Brick. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.155 
 Apple was clearly a direct seller to consumers from a for-
malistic standpoint.156 The real issue before the Court was whether 
Illinois Brick should be applied strictly or extended to protect a 
145 Id. 
146 The Court was divided five to four. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 
1515 (2019). 
147 Id. at 1518. 






154 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 
6253147, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013). 
155 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323–24 (9th Cir. 2017). 
156 Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1519. 
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direct seller if that seller did not actually set prices but simply 
received a commission.157 Ordinarily one would think that the price-
setting seller has whatever power there is to raise prices above 
competitive levels and would, thus, be the ultimate target of an 
antitrust action. That would mean, however, that consumers were 
one step away from the level at which prices were set and would 
not be classified as direct purchasers. This is, however, an overly 
simplistic view of the determinants of price. Apple did not set the 
price but it did set the 30 percent fee and whatever monopoly 
overcharge was suffered by the customers was likely in part the 
result of this 30 percent.158 In short, if Illinois Brick were literally 
applied, then consumers were direct purchasers.159 If it were ex-
panded to say that purchasers must buy directly from the price 
setting parties (in this case the app developers), then consumers 
were indirect purchasers.160 
 The Court was divided five–four.161 The majority stuck to a 
strict application of Illinois Brick.162 Apple was ruled to be a direct 
seller.163 Two aspects of the opinion are especially noteworthy. 
First the majority noted that any other outcome would mean that 
a monopoly retailer could avoid liability by allowing a manufac-
turer to set price and then just retain part of the proceeds from the 
sale.164 Far more important in terms of the continued viability of 
Illinois Brick, the Court addressed each of the rationales for that 
opinion and concluded that they did not apply here.165 It did this in 
a manner that could be interpreted as questioning whether any of 
the rationales for Illinois Brick itself continued to be compelling.166 
The first rationale, at least according to the majority, was that 
antitrust law would be more effectively enforced by concentrating 
the ability to pursue an action in direct purchasers.167 According 
to the majority this was not applicable in this case.168 Thus: 
157 Id. at 1522–23. 
158 Id. at 1523. 
159 Id. at 1519. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 1518. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1525. 
164 Id. at 1522. 
165 Id. at 1525. 
166 Id. at 1524. 
167 Id. at 1522. 
168 Id. 
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Leaving consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply 
because upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes 
little sense and would directly contradict the longstanding goal 
of effective private enforcement and consumer protection in an-
titrust cases.169 
 Second, Illinois Brick was based on the difficulty of deter-
mining damages.170 For example in the case at hand, if Apple 
were found liable the question would be how much lower in price 
apps would have been if it were found that the 30 percent charge 
was a product of monopolizing conduct. Here the majority noted 
that damages calculations are difficult in a great many antitrust 
cases and that Illinois Brick was not a “get-out-of-jail-free card 
for monopolistic retailers to play any time that a damages calcu-
lation might be complicated.”171 Third, the majority considered 
the rationale of Illinois Brick based on the difficulty of having to 
apportion a common fund of damages among direct and indirect 
purchasers.172 The majority simply noted in the case at hand 
there was only one group of potential plaintiffs.173 
 When the dissenting opinion is considered along with the 
majority opinion, what Apple Inc. illustrates is the unworkability of 
Illinois Brick. In a very sharply worded opinion written by Justice 
Gorsuch, the dissent viewed the issue in Apple Inc. as involving 
“exactly the kind of ‘pass-on theory’ Illinois Brick rejected.”174 Spe-
cifically, the minority reasoned, the 30 percent charge was something 
app suppliers were required to pay—like a cost of production.175 
Those suppliers then determined the price to charge for the apps.176 
In other words, whatever Apple may have done in violation of the 
antitrust laws had its initial impact on app developers who then 
passed-on that overcharge to consumers.177 
169 Id. at 1524. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1524–25. 
173 Id. at 1525. The Court did note that there may be multiple plaintiffs but 
that was normal in a great many cases. Also, it noted that Apple might be sued 
for monopolization by buyers and for monopolization by suppliers of apps. In 
this case, the damage theories would differ. Id. 
174 Id. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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 The dissent went on to argue that all the policies that were 
advanced by Illinois Brick came into play in the instant case.178 
For example, a court would have to determine to what extent Apple’s 
practices caused harm to the app developers and then of how 
much of the overcharge was actually passed onto consumers.179 In 
fact, there could be separate lawsuits by developers and consumers 
each wanting a piece of the overcharge pie180 and a resulting risk 
of duplicative recoveries.181 
 More important than these opposing views with respect to 
the practical effects of ruling one way or another is the clear indi-
cation that the Court is fundamentally divided over what Illinois 
Brick stands for. According to the dissent, the majority: 
(re)characterizes Illinois Brick as a rule that anyone who pur-
chases goods directly from an alleged antitrust violator can sue, 
while anyone who doesn’t, can’t. Under this revisionist version 
of Illinois Brick, the dispositive question becomes whether an 
“intermediary in the distribution chain” stands between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. And because the plaintiff app pur-
chasers in this case happen to have purchased apps directly 
from Apple, the Court reasons, they may sue.182 
 The dissent’s view was that Illinois Brick did not require a 
formalistic assessment of who were direct as opposed to indirect 
purchasers.183 Instead the underlying rationale for Illinois Brick 
was one of proximate cause.184 Thus, according to the dissent, 
“[i]nstead of focusing on the traditional proximate cause question 
where the overcharge is first (and thus surely felt) the Court’s test 
turns on who happens to be in privity of contract with whom.”185 
 In short, to the majority Illinois Brick provided a bright-line 
test of who was eligible to bring an antitrust action.186 To the dissent, 
Illinois Brick stood for a proximate cause analysis and, under the 
178 Id. at 1528–30. 
179 Id. at 1528. 
180 Id. at 1529. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1526. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 1529. 
186 Id. at 1515. 
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fact pattern in that case, it just so happened that direct purchasers 
were not within the scope of proximate causation.187 
  Ironically, both the majority and the dissent seem to un-
dercut Illinois Brick itself. The majority downplays the policies 
that were supposedly advanced by Illinois Brick arguing that they 
simply do not apply in Apple Inc. v. Pepper.188 In fact, it notes that 
all antitrust cases involve difficulties in determining damages.189 
As a general matter, it comes very close to opining that the dan-
gers Illinois Brick was designed to avoid were overstated. On the 
other hand, under the dissent’s “proximate cause” analysis one 
wonders what purpose Illinois Brick serves. Taken to its logical end, 
the indirect purchaser element of determining antitrust standing 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Liability Under the Rule of Reason 
 As noted at the outset, Illinois Brick reflects a policy of lim-
ited liability.190 That may have made sense in the context of 1960s 
and 1970s antitrust law. In that period a great number of prac-
tices were per se unlawful that are now assessed under the rule 
of reason.191 This raised the risk of false positives—finding that 
pro-competitive or harmless practices were unlawful.192 This has 
changed and there are few per se rules left.193 In addition, the per 
se rules that still exist have been softened.194 More importantly, 
empirical evidence is now available that demonstrates that, un-
der current law, plaintiffs rarely prevail.195 
 As indicated in the Introduction, the Sylvania case made the 
most important change in antitrust by ruling that vertical restraints 
on distribution would be assessed under the rule of reason.196 
187 Id. at 1526. 
188 Id. at 1524. 
189 Id. 
190 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
191 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See 
generally THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 253–54 (2d ed. 
2006); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 223–24. A good summary of 
developments is found in State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
192 Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 18, at 828. 
193 Id. 
194 See infra text accompanying notes 214–29. 
195 See infra text accompanying notes 229–47. 
196 Cont’l T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). 
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More importantly, the Court introduced the notion that restraints 
on intrabrand competition might be a necessary part of a plan to 
increase interbrand competition.197 It also noted the free rider prob-
lems faced by manufacturers who wanted resellers to be more ag-
gressive in sales efforts.198 
 Changing the status of restraints on distribution left intact 
vertical maximum and vertical minimum price fixing.199 These 
too, however, were eventually placed in the rule of reason category.200 
In State Oil v. Kahn,201 the Court overturned Albrecht v. Herald 
Co.,202 a 1967 case that held that vertical maximum resale price 
fixing was per se unlawful. The Albrecht Court reasoned that maxi-
mum prices could impede efforts by dealers to promote their prod-
ucts by offering services.203 Kahn, however, noted that the per se 
status of vertical maximum price fixing would encourage vertical 
integration.204 Moreover, it was unlikely that manufacturers would 
set prices so low that their resellers’ efforts would be impeded.205 
 It was not until 2007, in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. 
PKS, Inc.,206 that the nearly 100-year-old per se prohibition on set-
ting minimum resale prices was overturned. Although there was 
a substantial delay of 30 years since Sylvania, the decision in Leegin 
was largely a result of that case.207 In effect, manufacturers may 
find it advantageous in interbrand markets to restrict intrabrand 
competition based on price.208 Specifically, manufacturers finding 
that non-price competition was advantageous were faced with the 
free rider problem.209 Resellers offering more services to customers 
might find they were undercut by discounters who did not offer 
comparable services.210 
197 Id. at 54–55. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 57. 
200 State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 5 (1997).  
201 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
202 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968). 
203 Id. at 147. 
204 Kahn, 522 U.S. at 16. 
205 Id. at 17. 
206 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877 (2007). 
207 Id. at 884. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 877.  
210 Id. at 890. 
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 In the case of two other vertical restraints—exclusive deal-
ing211 and tying212—the shift in approach has been slightly less 
pronounced but it is nevertheless clear that the burden on plain-
tiffs is higher than prior to Sylvania. In the case of exclusive dealing 
it was once felt that the actual impact on competition need not be 
shown as long as a substantial share of a market was foreclosed 
to competitors.213 Now the approach has shifted to something 
closer to if not exactly like a rule of reason analysis.214 Specifically, 
courts have recognized the importance of exclusive dealing as a 
means of promoting interbrand competition.215 In effect, resellers 
who must only sell one brand will make maximum efforts to pro-
mote sales of that brand and will be limited in their ability to free 
ride on the efforts of the manufacturer.216 
 The analysis of tying arrangements has undergone a simi-
lar evolution.217 Early cases can fairly be said to have found that 
tying was per se unlawful218 as long as two products were involved 
and the defendant possessed power in the tying product and effected 
a substantial dollar amount of commerce in the tied product market. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet officially taken tying out 
of the per se category, it has added the requirement that the buyer 
actually be forced to purchase the tying product.219 In addition, 
the Court and lower courts seem more willing to question whether 
there are economic reasons regarding the “products” involved as 
a single product220 and to consider pro-competitive justifications.221 
211 Under an exclusive dealing arrangement, a reseller may only deal in the 
goods of its supplier. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 231. 
212 See Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). 
213 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 (1949). 
214 See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 231. 
215 See, e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 
1255 (3d Cir. 1975); Joyce Beverages of N.Y. Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 
F. Supp. 271, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See generally Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive 
Dealing After Jefferson Parish, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1229 (1985). 
216 Steuer, supra note 215, at 1235. 
217 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 2. 
218 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958). 
219 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. 
220 A good example of this is found in the four Justice concurrence in Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 11–12. See also the analysis in United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
221 See Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 36 (2006); Microsoft, 253 
F.3d at 34. See generally Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 62, at 964. 
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 The movement toward defendant-favoring standards of anal-
ysis has likewise extended to horizontal restraints where per se 
rules have been softened.222 The clearest sign of this shift came in 
two cases.223 In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, the Supreme Court seemed to relax the per se rule as it ap-
plied to price fixing in instances involving professional standards.224 
More importantly, in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System,225 the Court noted that the per se rule against price 
fixing was not to be applied literally but depended on whether the 
practice was designed to “increase economic efficiency and render 
markets more, rather than less, competitive.”226 In effect, the label 
“per se price fixing” was not to be applied until a harm/benefit 
analysis took place.227 
 Similarly, after a period during which group boycotts were 
felt to be per se unlawful,228 the Court seemed to revise its think-
ing. In Northwest Stationers v. Pacific Stationary and Printing 
Co.,229 the Court said that the per se label had been reserved for 
instances in which the boycotting firms possess market power, de-
nied the boycotted firm access to suppliers or customers, and were 
not consistent with enhancing overall efficiency.230 As with Broadcast 
Music, the announced approach necessitated a measuring of harms 
and benefits before applying the per se label.231 
 This major shift away from per se rules means that, except 
in very few instances, cases are now assessed under the rule of 
reason.232 It is not an exaggeration to say that the rule of reason 
means that defendants prevail in the vast majority of cases.233 
This means that the multiple liability danger that was at the heart 
222 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978). 
223 See generally Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs’, 435 U.S. at 679. 
224 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs’, 435 U.S. at 679. 
225 441 U.S. at 1. 
226 Id. at 20. 
227 See id.  
228 See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 
229 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
230 Nw. Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985). 
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of Illinois Brick is no longer a threat (if it ever was).234 Two em-
pirical studies by Michael Carrier illustrate just how much the 
odds are against plaintiffs under the rule of reason.235 First, it is 
useful to recall the progression in a rule of reason case. Initially 
the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant’s 
action was anticompetitive.236 Typically this means defining the 
market and assessing the action’s impact in the market.237 The 
burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the prac-
tice had pro-competitive impact.238 At that point, the plaintiff may 
attempt to show that there are less restrictive methods of achiev-
ing the pro-competitive effects.239 After that, the actual pro and 
anticompetitive effects are weighed.240 
 Carrier examined all rule of reason cases in the period from 
1977 (the year of Sylvania) to 1999.241 There were 495 cases.242 Of 
these, 84 percent did not make it past the first step.243 In other 
words, 84 percent of the time plaintiffs lost even before any bal-
ancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects took place.244 In fact, 
the balancing step was only reached in 4 percent of cases with the 
vast majority having been dismissed in the defendant’s favor.245 
Carrier updated his study in 2009, this time with a sample of 222 
rule of reason cases.246 The results were even more pronounced. This 
time, nearly 97 percent of rule of reason cases were dismissed at 
the first stage of the analysis.247 In fact, only five cases made it to the 
balancing stage.248 The salient point is that since there is rarely 
liability under the rule of reason, the fears of complicated processes 
234 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
235 Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 18, at 827; Carrier, Bridging the 
Disconnect, supra note 18, at 1265. 
236 Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect, supra note 18, at 1268. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 1265. 
240 Carrier, The Rule of Reason, supra note 18, at 827. 
241 Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect, supra note 18, at 1265. 
242 Id. at 1272. 
243 Id. at 1265. 
244 Id. at 1360. 
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of apportioning damages and multiple liability as expressed by the 
Illinois Brick Court simply do not exist. Moreover, a policy, as evi-
denced by Illinois Brick, of limited exposure of defendants to indirect 
purchasers for fear of generating false positives is unsupportable. 
C. Procedural and Evidentiary Changes Since Illinois Brick 
 The policies underpinning Illinois Brick have also become 
moot because of changes in the law since 1977 dealing with pleading 
standards, expert testimony, and class certification. The critical case 
with respect to the first of these is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,249 
a 2007 Supreme Court decision. That decision raised the bar for an-
titrust plaintiffs by changing what was necessary to avoid a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.250 Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that the defendants 
entered into an actual agreement.251 In Twombly, plaintiffs sought 
to meet the pleading requirements by stating that the defendants 
had engaged in parallel conduct.252 From this, the inference to be 
drawn was that they had agreed on their anticompetitive actions.253 
Under prior law, a complaint was not to be dismissed unless “it 
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”254 
 Although parallel conduct is certainly consistent with the 
existence of an agreement, as the Twombly Court noted,255 it is 
also consistent with the absence of an agreement. Accordingly, 
parallel conduct is “just as much in line with a wide swath of ra-
tional and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted 
by common perceptions of the market.”256 Based on this, it agreed 
with the trial court that the complaint should be dismissed.257 In 
so doing, it announced a new and higher pleading standard.258 
That standard was a requirement of fact that made the existence 
249 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
250 Id. at 570. 
251 Id. at 545. 
252 Id. at 544. 
253 Id. at 548. 
254 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
255 550 U.S. at 553. 
256 Id. at 554. 
257 Id. at 549. 
258 Id. at 569. 
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of a conspiracy “plausible”259 not merely possible under some sets 
of circumstances. 
 There can be little doubt that Twombly was intended to 
raise the bar for plaintiffs.260 It increases the burden at the pleading 
stage and requires the assertion of facts that may not be known 
until after discovery.261 Just how high the bar has been raised is the 
subject of disagreement.262 Moreover, raising the bar does not neces-
sarily mean increasing the rate of dismissals.263 In fact, a compre-
hensive 2017 study of the impact of Twombly on cases generally 
indicates that the dismissal rates before and after Twombly are 
basically the same.264 This may reflect the failure of lower courts 
to interpret Twombly as requiring a change from prior pleading 
practices.265 It also may simply note an adjustment in actual 
pleadings in order to avoid the implications of Twombly.266 What-
ever the adjustment, the fact that it must be made at all inures 
to the benefit of antitrust defendants.267 
 A change with respect to admissible evidence in the post–
Illinois Brick era has also likely affected the prospects for private 
antitrust plaintiffs. Recall that the Illinois Brick Court feared be-
ing enmeshed in a complicated process of apportioning a fixed 
overcharge amount among plaintiffs in the chain of distribution 
and the threat of multiple liability.268 Whatever the validity of the 
Court’s rationale in 1977, it is questionable by virtue of its 1993 
259 Id. at 545. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change after Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007); Goldman, supra note 
63, at 1057; Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly: A Study of the Impact 
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12 (b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1811, 1814 (2008); Jonathan M. Herman, Jaime Stilson & Kaleb McNeely, 
Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder: Circuits Address How to Read Twombly, 
32 ANTITRUST 32, 32 (2017); William H. J. Hubbard, The Effect of Twombly and 
Iqbal, 14 J. EM. LEG. STUD. 474, 474 (2017); Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin, 
and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 161 (2007). 
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decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.269 In that 
case the Court ratcheted up the requirement for the introduction 
of expert testimony, a great deal of which is about the subject of 
damages.270 Under the so-called Frye271 standard, expert testimony, 
to be admissible, had to be generally accepted in the relevant sci-
entific community.272 Daubert established additional factors for 
the introduction of expert testimony, including whether the method-
ology “can be (and has been) tested,”273 whether it has been sub-
jected to “peer review and publication,”274 “the known or potential 
rate of error,”275 and acceptance in a specifically recognized scien-
tific community.276 All of these requirements are in service to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, which allows admissibility when the evi-
dence “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue.”277 
 The implications of Daubert on Illinois Brick may not be 
immediately obvious. It is important, though, to recall that Illinois 
Brick excludes parties who are admittedly harmed by those vio-
lating the antitrust law because recognition of their right to bring 
an action would render matters too complicated.278 If it is to have 
any substantive import, the Court must mean that outcomes with 
respect to harm would be unreliable because of the complexity of 
determining damages. Obviously, the reasoning has a tail-wagging-
the-dog element: because determination of the appropriate remedy 
is difficult, the plaintiff is denied the opportunity to demonstrate 
269 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Defining Forensic 
Economics in the Post–Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2000); Michele Molyneaux, Comment, Quality 
Control of Economic Expert Testimony: The Fundamental Methods of Proving 
Antitrust Damages, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1049 (2003); Molly L. Zohn, Comment, 
How Antitrust Damages Measure Up With Respect to Daubert Factors, 13 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 697 (2005). 
270 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
271 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). 
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273 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
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275 Id. at 594. 
276 Id. 
277 FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
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liability. Nevertheless, after Daubert, the problem of complexity 
and uncertainty can be dealt with at the point of the admissibility 
of evidence. If a judge determines the submission is not helpful to 
the trier of fact, it can be excluded. Plaintiffs with difficult to prove 
damages may choose to forgo bringing an action. On the other hand, 
with modern econometric methods, the complications of 1977 may 
be far less troublesome today.279 
 Changes that undermine the need for Illinois Brick can 
also be traced to modifications in certifying classes in antitrust 
action. The drift in this respect has been in the direction of requir-
ing those attempting to certify a class to bear the burden of proof 
on the merits of the underlying theory of liability.280 The harm to 
be avoided, arguably, is that the easy certification of a class may 
result in settlement of relatively meritless suits.281 Although not an 
antitrust case, the most important decision in this regard is Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.282 The principal issue in Wal-Mart was 
whether a group wishing to be certified as a class satisfied the 
commonality requirement under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
23(a)(2) and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).283 
 The case involved accusations of gender discrimination 
against Wal-Mart.284 According to the court, in order to satisfy 
class certification requirements, it was not enough to simply allege 
279 Id. 
280 According to the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, this 
is often the case. 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 (2011). 
281 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 275 (2014); 
White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000). 
282 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
283 Id. at 349. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are as follows:  
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: 
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is im-
practicable; 
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class; and the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3). 
284 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 343. 
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that Wal-Mart engaged in discriminatory conduct.285 Instead, it 
was necessary to present “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated 
under a general policy of discrimination.”286 In effect, the merits of 
the case became intertwined with the issue of class certification. 
 According to one commentator who has followed class cer-
tification requirements in the context of antitrust cases, the 2011 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores was “anticlimactic.”287 The merging 
of issues of commonality and predominance for class certification 
purposes with the merits of the case had already occurred in an-
titrust.288 In the context of this analysis, this represents an addi-
tional barrier to plaintiffs and another reason that Illinois Brick’s 
protection of defendants is unwarranted. For example, in In re New 
Motor Vehicle Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation,289 a suit brought 
by buyers and lessees of automobiles, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit noted, with respect to class certification, that “[i]n-
tertwined with the scope of our review on appeal is the question 
of how far a district court should go in testing legal and factual 
premises at the certification stage. When such premises are dis-
puted, the court may ‘probe beneath the pleadings.’”290 In revers-
ing the lower court’s decision to certify the class, the appellate 
court required “a more thorough explanation of how the pivotal 
evidence behind plaintiff’s theory can be established. If there is 
no realistic means of proof, many resources will be wasted setting 
up a trial the plaintiffs cannot win.”291 
 Similar in tone is Blades v. Monsanto,292 in which the pro-
posed class was composed of farmers who purchased corn and soy-
bean seeds at prices that were allegedly the result of price fixing. 
285 Id. at 350. 
286 Id. at 353 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 
(1982)). 
287 Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, A Questionable New Standard for 
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, ANTITRUST 31, 31 (2011); see also Hal J. 
Singer, Economic Evidence of Common Impact for Class Certification in Anti-
trust Cases: A Two-Step Analysis, 25 ANTITRUST 34, 34 (2010). 
288 Davis & Cramer, supra note 287, at 31–32. 
289 522 F.3d 6, 6 (1st Cir. 2008). 
290 In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 
(2008) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 
291 Id. at 29. 
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Here, the court announced the premise for its analysis: “[t]he pre-
liminary inquiry at the class certification stage may require the 
court to resolve disputes going to the factual setting of the case, 
and such disputes may overlap the merits of the case.”293 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit then went on to affirm the 
lower court’s denial of certification.294 Specifically, it rejected the 
expert testimony for the plaintiffs because it did not consider 
“whether the markets or the alleged conspiracy at issue here ac-
tually operated in such a manner as to justify [the] presumption”295 
that impact can be determined on a class-wide basis. 
 The overall point is that whatever fears may have existed 
in 1977 about multiple liability and complexity seem far less jus-
tified today, if they are even justified at all. New pleading stand-
ards have raised the burden of successful litigation to plaintiffs.296 
After Daubert, complexity may still exist, but a court is free to 
exclude testimony that is not sound and unlikely to help the try-
ing of fact.297 Finally, the danger that liberal class certification 
will lead to meritless claims by classes of plaintiffs has surely de-
clined after Twombly and the merger of class certification issues 
with issues of liability. 
D. Questions of Motivation 
 A critical element of Illinois Brick is the Court’s decision to 
choose deterrent over-compensation as the primary goal of anti-
trust damages. The problem is that there is little or no reason to 
believe that, as an empirical matter, direct purchasers have been 
more aggressive private enforcers of the antitrust laws than indi-
rect purchasers. First, many direct purchasers may fear offending 
suppliers on which they depend. Second, it is possible that firms 
that are able to pass on most or all of an overcharge are simply 
not motivated to pursue an award that may be perceived as a 
windfall. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 572. 
295 Id. at 570. 
296 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). 
297 See Daubert v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
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 On the issue of the aggressiveness of direct purchasers, one 
excellent example is the case of Campos v. Ticketmaster, discussed 
earlier.298 There, it will be recalled, purchasers of tickets through 
Ticketmaster were classified as indirect purchasers of tickets.299 
The direct purchasers of Ticketmaster’s services supposedly were 
the venues at which concerts were held.300 The problem is those so-
called direct purchasers had no motivation to sue Ticketmaster. 
They were involved in a transaction with Ticketmaster but, as 
Joseph Bauer has observed, “this was clearly not a situation 
where Ticketmaster had created a product and then sold it at an 
elevated price to its ‘direct purchaser,’ which in turn sold it to the 
indirect purchaser plaintiffs.”301 In fact, the question becomes on 
what basis the venues would have recovered. They did not pur-
chase tickets, nor did they pay for ticket distribution services.302 
There are other instances which create doubt about the Court’s 
belief that purchasers would be the most motivated to bring ac-
tions.303 According to an American Antitrust Institute Working 
Paper, “[i]n the Microsoft class action litigation, no significant di-
rect purchaser class was ever certified, leaving the vast majority 
of direct purchasers uncompensated.”304 In fact, it was estimated 
that of possibly billions of dollars of damages, only $10.5 million 
were ever recovered.305 
 There are good reasons for direct purchasers to not pursue 
actions against their suppliers. The most obvious one is that the 
supplier or suppliers may possess market or monopoly power. If 
the supplier or suppliers are the primary or only sources of needed 
inputs, a lawsuit may mean the end of what was a critical rela-
tionship. Another theory, forwarded by Barak Richman and 
Christopher Murray, is that price fixing suppliers may actually 
298 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998). See supra text accompanying notes 136–45. 
299 Id. at 1171. 
300 Id. 
301 Bauer, supra note 10, at 447. 
302 Id. 
303 Gavil, supra note 10, at 191–92. 
304 Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group on Remedies, 
AM. ANTITRUST INST. 19 (June 17, 2005), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2018/08/423.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV24-H6LD]. 
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share the benefits of their activities with direct purchasers.306 The 
authors base their theory on the idea that “an upstream cartel can 
prevent private litigation as long as it assures that its direct pur-
chasers downstream benefit more from the existence of the cartel 
than they can claim antitrust damages for.”307 
 There are no doubt cases in which direct purchasers do not 
fear retaliation by the price fixing cartel and are not actually 
made better off by virtue of sharing in the profits garnered by the 
price fixers. Even in this so-called “clean” case, can we be certain 
that direct purchasers will aggressively pursue legal action? In cases 
that they cannot pass on the overcharge, it would seem likely but 
with possible exceptions. In cases that the overcharge can easily 
be passed-on, the probabilities likely drop. This may seem coun-
terintuitive. In both cases—no or little pass-on or full pass-on—it 
appears to be in the profit maximizing interest of the firm to pursue 
the maximum expected recovery possible. This raises two related 
questions. First, do firms take advantage of every profit maximiz-
ing opportunity? Second, are firms that pass on most or all of the 
overcharge rather easily likely to feel as “damaged” or as “wronged” 
as firms that are unable to pass on the overcharge? 
 Both of these questions seem awkward because they raise 
issues of how firms behave and or what might be called the “psy-
chology” of business decisions. Whether firms seek solely to max-
imize profits has been a long-standing area of debate.308 In theory, 
a corporation that is under performing is ripe for a takeover by 
those who see the potential for increased profit. This obviously 
raises principal-agent issues—just how much do the utility func-
tions of those who manage firms deviate from the goals of share-
holders? Even if one thinks the deviation between the goals of 
306 Richman & Murray, supra note 10, at 94–95. 
307 Id. at 95 n.118 and accompanying text; see also Schinkel et al., supra 
note 10, at 684. 
308 See generally Adamantios Diamantopoulos & Brian P. Mathews, The 
Specification of Pricing Objectives: Empirical Evidence for Oligopoly Firm, 15 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 73 (1994); George W. England & Raymond Lee, 
Organizational Goals and Expected Behavior Among American, Japanese, and 
Korean Managers—A Comparative Study, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 425 (1971); 
H.T. Koplin The Profit Maximization Assumption, 15 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 
130 (1963); Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective 
Revisited, 15 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 350 (2004).  
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management and shareholders is rare and narrow, that does not 
solve the problem. 
 Although impossible to verify as an empirical matter, there 
is no doubt that many direct purchasers are not corporations. 
When management and ownership merge, the preference of man-
agement for lower stress, leisure time, and an aversion to confron-
tation may result in avoiding legal action, even when the expected 
monetary value is positive. Although it is conjecture, behavior 
may change, especially for the manager/owner when overcharges 
are easily passed-on. When they are not passed-on the result is a 
decrease in profit. When they are passed-on, profits remain the 
same and there may be little incentive to litigate over what may 
be perceived as a windfall. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Antitrust policy is largely shaped by the desire to balance the 
problems of false positives and false negatives. False positives oc-
cur when a harmless or pro-competitive activity is found to violate 
the antitrust laws.309 False negatives are obviously the opposite.310 
The problem is particularly severe in antitrust because most acti-
vities are assessed under the rule of reason, which is by no means a 
bright-line test.311 The continued application of Illinois Brick is 
best assessed in terms of whether it increases the likelihood of 
errors of either type. 
 The possibility that loosening the reins of Illinois Brick in 
the current era of antitrust would result in greater error rates is 
exceedingly slim. This Article explains why. Antitrust law has 
changed dramatically since 1977.312 The substantive law has shifted 
to be highly protective of defendants.313 Success for a plaintiff in 
a rule of reason case is rare.314 Procedural changes relating to 
pleading and class certification have also raised barriers to plain-
tiffs.315 Standards have also been raised with respect to expert 
309 Barnett, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
310 See id. 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 232–40. 
312 Supra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
313 See supra Section II.B. 
314 Supra text accompanying notes 242–48. 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 249–67, 280–95. 
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testimony that make it unlikely that any but the most well devel-
oped damages theories will be admitted into evidence.316 Finally, 
Apple v. Pepper reveals a sharp division in the Court on the issue 
of what Illinois Brick means.317 In sum, whatever role Illinois 
Brick may have ever played in rationalizing antitrust law is now 
unneeded, and the recent decision by the Court illustrates that, 
after forty years, a consensus is lacking on what it stands for.318 
 The question then becomes what adjustments should be 
made. This Article closes with three possibilities. 
 
1. The first and least complicated is simply to overturn 
Illinois Brick. Yes, this will invite more litigation by 
indirect purchasers, but, given the documented re-
luctance of direct purchasers to pursue actions, this 
may be necessary. The concern about multiple liability 
noted by the Court in Illinois Brick is overstated.319 
Each indirect purchaser should be limited to a recovery 
equal to the amount by which it was actually dam-
aged—not a portion of the overcharge. A corollary to 
this is that direct purchasers would also be entitled to 
the amount by which they were damaged. As noted ear-
lier, the Court’s decision to adopt the overcharge meas-
ure of damages in price fixing cases but not in others 
was not well-founded. Restricting plaintiffs to lost prof-
its means that there is no danger of duplicative recov-
eries and that Hanover Shoe also becomes obsolete. 
2. A second approach involves a slight reinterpretation 
of Associated General Contractors. It will be recalled 
that the Court weighs a variety of factors in its standing 
analysis.320 One of those factors—direct purchasing—
has become a required factor.321 An approach that 
would alleviate the harshness of Illinois Brick would 
be to simply make directness of the injury one of the 
factors to be weighed against the others. In short, 
316 See supra text accompanying notes 268–79. 
317 See supra Section II.A.2. 
318 See supra text accompanying note 146. 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 296–97.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 86–95.  
321 See supra text accompanying notes 90–92. 
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directness would no longer be necessary in order for 
an antitrust plaintiff to have standing. Interestingly 
this is arguably consistent with a careful reading of 
Associated General Contractors.322 
3. The third approach would be the most difficult for 
the Court to implement. It would provide an Illinois 
Brick exemption for indirect purchasers in cases in 
which substantial direct purchaser action has not 
been brought within a specified period of time.323 For 
example, if three years after the cause of action ac-
crues, the direct purchasers had not filed an action, 
the Illinois Brick “gate” would open for indirect pur-
chasers. Realistically, it is difficult to imagine this 
exemption as resulting from judicial action. It would 
require the unlikely event of a case making it to the 
Supreme Court in which such an exemption was ap-
plied by a lower court. If this proposal were adopted, it 
seems more likely to be the result of legislative action. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 91–99. 
323 A similar approach was advanced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2003). 
